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1. Preface 
Thirty-five years ago, some members of Kyoto Economic Council visited Boston and came 
across “Venture Capital” (hereafter abbreviated “VC”) which did not exist in Japan at that time. 
Although what they found was slightly different from what they had looked for, they tried to set 
up the first “Venture Capital Firm” (hereafter abbreviated “VCF”) in Kyoto.  
Since then, Japanese VC has gone through ups and downs, and grown into a trillion yen 
industry.  However, a trillion yen amount of VC’s total investment balance accounts only 0.2% of 
GDP in Japan.  If we compare it with the total financial assets of 1,400 trillion yen and foreign 
VC’s balance of 30 trillion yen in the US (3% of its GPD), we can hardly claim that Japanese VC 
has developed suitably in its economy.  Nevertheless, this shows that there is still a substantial 
room for further development, which makes VC still a promising industry in Japan. 
Even though Japanese economy is acclaimed to have recovered since 2004, considering the 
existing regional economy and large income difference among people, we cannot be optimistic for 
the future.  The economic recovery that represents a new era must be led by new industries.  
New industries require some amount of new investment like that of VC, in which Mrs. J. Jacobs 
described as “Development Capital”4.  However, the amount of less than 0.2% of GDP seems 
insufficient for the new growth toward the future.   
When the first VCF was established, VC was not known in the Japanese business world.  
When Japanese Venture Capital Association (JVCA) was established in 2001 by the effort of VC’s 
persons, VC was recognized as the front-line financial activity. VC movement in Japan continued 
to grow and eventually won its address in the financial world.  It is expected to contribute to the 
revitalization of Japanese economy.    
This is hence a good time to reconsider the role of VC and some subjects in which solutions 
are needed.  For this purpose, many VCists and researchers from aboard were invited to join the 
International Venture Capital Forum held in Kyoto University in November 2006. Prior to this 
event, the questionnaire survey was conducted both with front-line VCFs and venture capitalists 
(hereafter abbreviated “VCist”) by Kyoto University.  The summary of this questionnaire will be 
presented in this paper. 
Up to present time, information on Japanese VC is available only from two research sources; 
Nikkei Newspaper and Venture Enterprise Center (VEC, METI’s research arm).  The main aim 
for these researches is to indicate (1) the overall investment situation, such as the amount of 
investment and balance, and types of industry, and (2) the investment performance measured by 
IRR (internal rate of return).  Dating back ten years prior to this, there was completely no 
available information concerning VC in Japan.  This created so much difficulty in term of 
investment judgment among foreign investors and domestic potential investors like the pension 
funds. 
As the first trial to fill up this information gap, VEC provided outline of VC in accordance to 
information (1) and (2) above.  However, there is a need to step further into information 
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concerning management behavior.  Not as easy as it may sound, this information is hard to 
acquire.  Many VCFs did not like to reveal their inside strategy and had a tendency to avoid 
clarifying their own standard of investment, or else, they would follow tacit custom of imitating 
behavioral path of the largest pioneer firm.  This pattern started to change in the year 2000 when 
many so-called independent VC companies came into picture, one after another, and disclosed 
their own style of management behavior.  Although there were many problems including 
scandals loomed up, this emergent of many VCFs brought about the new era of VC in Japan. 
At present, there are still many issues related to VC that require careful attention.  These are 
such issues concerning moral hazard problems between stockholders and investors of fund, 
disallocations of funds, first price-ceiling of IPO, low assessment of public offering prices, IPO 
standards of security markets, means for seeking suitable investment, methods for calculation, 
assessments of IRR and to name a few.  Our concern lies at how useful academic method is in 
solving these problems.  Even though all of these problems cannot be solved at once, the 
questionnaire survey was conducted to provide more information related to these issues, 
especially concerning moral hazard, offering price, the elements of enterprise value assessment 
and the elements of hands-on (various kinds of support along with the fund for the companies by 
VCists.) 
 
Summary of research 
- Although it is often stated that bio-technology comes next after the IT bubble, it might be not 
true for the case of VC investment.  IT industry still exists as large as 40%, with conventional 
type of industry capturing close to 40% of the pie.  In contrast to this, bio-technology 
remains only 17% at most.  The investment to bio-technology seems not to have increased 
much because long-term investment requires rigid conditions and special knowledge. 
- The ratio of cases using IPO as an exit of investment was nearly 30% (according to the 
investigation with VCFs), which was higher than that of foreign VCFs. Even though the 
investment in the U.S. and U.K. tends to be made in forms of M&A and MBO, the main 
business still remains not in private-equity but in VC in Japan. If the trend continues, the 
so-called “junior market” should be prepared (to prevent scandals and promote IPO), and 
relevant markets should be inevitably unified. On the other hand, the rate of “resale to other 
shareholders or their original owners,” and “insolvency, dissolution and liquidation” amount 
to more than 30% combined.  As a consequent, the second-hand market is also required. 
- The highest performance is achieved at sales after IPO at first price-ceilings.  A possession of 
more than one year after IPO inversely deteriorates the performance.  
- The problem of moral hazard does not yet appear on the surface.  Even if it exists, it is well 
managed.  In some cases, a stockholder of VCF and an investor of fund lie in the same 
person.   
- The first price-ceiling reflects some problems that are believed to have caused by private 
investors’ behavior.  Public offering price also seems to be fixed lower than public 
expectation, in which reflects a problem caused by the attitude of managing underwriter 
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(securities house). 
- The crucial information used in selecting companies for investment is information concerning 
company’s president and its surroundings, the market and products, the persuasive power of 
business plan, and to name a few.  
- There is still no single standard method for valuation and such method is still being searched 
for.  
 
This questionnaire survey was conducted with both firms and VCists who represent two 
different standpoints.  Firms’ questionnaire described the results of their past performance based 
on firms’ report.  On the other hand, VCists completed the questionnaires based on their own 
experiences.  As a consequence, VCists answers can be assumed to be more realistic. 
Capitalists’ answers concerning information on investment assessment are rather high in many 
items.  The use of evaluation method is also high among capitalists, but it does not mean that 
there is any specific method used for such assessment.  By this, we can read the irresolute minds 
of capitalists on how they evaluate the industry.  Expected profit rate by stage of development is 
also higher in capitalists than VCFs.  This can possibly imply a stricter evaluation scheme among 
capitalists in this industry.  
The view on first price-ceiling is different among firms and capitalists.  The answer 
regarding first price-ceiling as a crucial problem is 12% among firms, but 22% among capitalists.  
The responses from firms which were conducted in planning and general affairs divisions may 
deviate from that by actual sections where crisis is taken more sensitively.  Even in the setting of 
offering price, capitalists criticize firms’ policy much stronger than firms do.  While many 
capitalists regard low offer-price unreasonable and seek room for adjustment, firms claimed it to 
be “reasonable”.  
VCFs in Japan have a systematically organized process from investment findings to IPO.  
The significant task of capitalists lies at the process from the finding of investment to the 
execution of first investment.   Many of capitalists must prepare for investment decision, 
nevertheless hardly involve in the making of such decision itself.  They work hard to support 
companies until the companies grow.  However, it is undeniable that the offer-price is decided by 
different elements far from the capitalists’ efforts.  
Although approximately 80% of capitalists come to notice problems of underwriting stock 
houses, companies do not.  As many as 27% of capitalists asserted that under-pricing is caused 
by “The process of determining public offering price”.  At the same time, only 12% of the firms 
believed so.  At this point, we can see the agony of capitalists who are active in first line business 
in Japan.  
 
 
2. Research method and attribute of respondents 
We conducted a postal questionnaire survey with Japanese VCFs and individual VCists, with 
an aim to uncover their investing activities.  This section describes the research method and 
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attribute of respondents.  
 
2.1 Research method 
We sent out questionnaire forms from late July to mid August, 2006, to a total of 157 VCFs, 
namely corporate members of the Japan Venture Capital Association and companies listed on the 
“Japan Venture Capital Directory in FY2005” published by Venture Enterprise Center in 2006. 
This paper analyzes 41 VCFs responses in which returned before late September, 2006, having 
response rate of 26.1%.  In this survey, we asked VCFs to present their official corporate views.  
Following the sending of these questionnaire forms, during late August to late September, we 
contacted non-responding VCFs via phone, fax, and e-mail to remind them of questionnaire 
response.  At the same time, we conducted follow-up surveys with VCFs who had already 
returned the questionnaires.   
Furthermore, we approached VCists both directly and indirectly through VCFs listed above, 
and asked them to participate in our questionnaire survey.  In this survey, “VCists” refers to 
individuals who are directly involved in VC investment processes, from finding and screening to 
post-investment activities including exiting, but excluding employees of VCFs who are in charge 
of other tasks rather than investment processes, such as those from general and personnel affairs.  
We sent out a range of 3 to 15 questionnaire forms to each VCF according to the size of their 
annual investment listed on FY2004.  For this part, a total of 614 questionnaire forms were 
posted during late July and mid August 2006.  This paper analyzes responses submitted by 105 
VCists which were received before late September 2006.  In this survey, VCists were asked to 
respond based on their individual experiences and points of view.  Following the sending of 
questionnaire forms, from late August to late September, we contacted non-responding VCists 
directly or through VCFs via phone, fax, and e-mail to remind them of questionnaire response.  
At the same time, we conducted follow-up surveys with VCists who had already returned the 
questionnaires.   
 
2.2 Attribute of respondents 
2.2.1 VCFs 
Among 41 valid responses from VCFs, 3 were established in the 1960s, 2 in the 1970s, 9 
in the 1980s, 11 in the 1990s, and 16 in the 2000s.  The average number of employees is 86.41 
(standard deviation: 221.78).  For the past decade (since April 1996), these VCFs have invested 
in 293.35 companies on average (standard deviation: 426.30) 
The average breakdown by business category of investee companies in which respondents 
invested in since April 1996 is as follows: IT-related business (communication, computer, internet, 
semi-conductor, and other electronic components), 38.9%; bio-technology, medical and healthcare 
service industry, 17.4%; industrial and energy services (agriculture, forestry, fishery, construction, 
industrial and energy service, manufacturing, transportation, and utility service), 19.8%; 
products/services (business- and consumer-related services, finance, insurance, and real estate), 
17.6%; others, 6.2%. 
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Regarding the average breakdown of exits among these investee companies, 29.4% of 
investee companies were IPOed, 9.45% were merged/acquired for further business development, 
18.6% were sold to other shareholders or their original owners, 15.5% went bankrupt or were 
dissolved/liquidated, and 27.7% were others.   
 
2.2.2 VCists 
The 105 responses show that respondents, on average, have been involved in investing 
activities as VCists for 7.38 years (standard deviation: 4.78), and non-investing activities for 3.59 
years (standard deviation: 5.93). At the same time, the average number of years of business 
experience at non-VCFs is 8.55 years (standard deviation: 8.45). 
The number of investee companies in which respondents had been in charge of since April 
1996, but excluding the ones in their current charge, is 28.36 on average (standard deviation: 
34.98).  Among these companies, new technology-based investee companies having filed patents 
or achieved other technical innovations account for 33.0% on average (standard deviation: 31.83).  
The average number of investee companies in which respondents are presently in charge of is 
16.25 (standard deviation: 17.24), having new technology-based investee companies of 39.6% on 
average (standard deviation: 34.21). 
The average breakdown by business category of investee companies in which respondents 
had been in charge of since April 1996 (excluding the ones in their current charge) is as follows: 
IT-related business, 39.7%; bio-technology, medical and healthcare service industry, 13.2%; 
industrial and energy services, 13.7%; products/services, 29.5%; others, 3.6%. Additionally, the 
average breakdown of investee companies in which respondents are presently in charge of is as 
follows: IT-related business, 38.2%; bio-technology, medical and healthcare service industry, 
19.3%; industrial and energy services, 12.2%; products/services, 26.8%; others, 3.3%. 
Regarding the average breakdown of exits of investee companies in which respondents 
had been in charge of since April 1996 (excluding the ones in their current charge), 25.6% of 
investee companies were IPOed, 9.6% were merged/acquired for further business development, 
23.9% were sold to other shareholders or their original owners, 11.5% went bankrupt or were 
dissolved/liquidated, and 29.0% were others.   
Respondents were asked to identify the stage of development, during the time of 
investment, of investee companies in which respondents had been in charge of since April 1996 
(excluding the ones in their current charge). The average results are as follows: Start-up Stage 
(from inauguration to achievement of sales), 17.6%; Early Stage (from achievement of sales to 
achievement of single-year profit), 35.9%; Growth Stage (from achievement of single-year profit 
to elimination of cumulative loss), 22.9%; Later Stage (from elimination of cumulative loss to 
IPO), 22.2%.  In addition, the stage of development of investee companies in which respondents 
are presently in charge of is as follows; Start-up Stage, 21.6%; Early Stage, 38.2%; Growth Stage, 




3. Conflicts of Interest 
There are two types of conflicts of interest involving VCFs, their shareholders, and investors 
of VC funds.  The first type is a “conflict of interest between VCFs’ direct investment and funds”. 
This type of conflict arises at the stage of determining which of these two investment kinds should 
be invested in promising companies, or how they should be allocated for investment.  The second 
type of conflict is a “conflict of interest among VC funds”.  This arises in similar circumstance, 
but among VCFs who manage multiple funds at a time. Specifically, it is the conflict of interest 
when determining which fund to be invested in promising companies, or how they should be 
allocated for investment.  
In this survey, VCFs were asked whether they had experienced any conflict of interest among 
VCFs, their shareholders and investors of VC fund (e.g. whether they had received complaints 
from any of their fund investors). 7.3% of them (3 VCFs) replied “yes”, while 80.5% replied “no”.  
12.2% of the respondents did not answer the question.  The 3 VCFs who replied “yes” were 
further asked how they coped with the situation.  All of them responded that they had established 
clear internal standards that were satisfactory to all stakeholders. 
The questionnaire then asked if respondents had experienced any conflict of interest among 
VC funds (e.g. whether they had received complaints from any of their fund investors). 4.9% (2 
VCFs) replied “yes”, while 82.9% replied “no”. 12.2% of the respondents did not answer the 
question.  The 2 VCFs who replied “yes” were further asked how they coped with the situation.  
Both of the respondents stated that they had established clear internal standards in which were 
satisfactory to all stakeholders.  
 
 
4. Investment Decision Making 
4.1 Source of information 
To determine the main sources of information used in deciding investment destinations, VCFs 
and VCists were asked to rate the following items on a scale of 1 (never use) to 5 (always use). 
These items were selected based on the study by Manigart, Waele, Wright, Robbie, Desbrieres, 
Sapienza, Beekman (2000): (1) Curriculum vitae of management, (2) Interviews with management, 
(3) Interviews with other company personnel, (4) Sales and marketing information, (5) Production 
capacity/technical information, (6) Own due diligence report, (7) Due diligence by 
accounting/consulting firms, (8) Business plan (overall consistency), (9) Business plan (P/L), (10) 
Business plan (B/S), (11) Business plan (“latest period” financial statements), (12) Business plan 
(more than 1 year ahead), (13) Business plan (qualified audit report).   
Among VCFs, (2) Interviews with management was ranked the highest on average, followed 
by (1) Curriculum vitae of management, (11) Business plan (“latest period” financial statements), 
and (8) Business plan (overall consistency).  VCists also ranked (2) Interviews with management 
the highest on average, followed by (1) Curriculum vitae of management, (11) Business plan 
(“latest period” financial statements), and (9) Business plan (P/L) (see Table 1).  The comparison 
between these results and the results shown in Manigart et al. (2000) indicates that Japanese VCFs 
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and VCists place more importance on curriculum vitae of managements and interviews with them 
for decision making than their counterparts.   
 
Table 1: Sources of information for valuation 
Manigart et al. (2000)  
VCF VCist
U.S. U.K. N&B Fran
(1) Curriculum vitae of management 4.73 4.80 4.19 3.91 4.34 4.41
(2) Interviews with management  4.93 4.91 4.22 3.65 4.47 4.25
(3) Interviews with other company personnel 4.30 4.51 3.74 3.17 4.00 4.25
(4) Sales and marketing information 4.62 4.73 3.89 3.80 4.24 4.25
(5) Production capacity/technical information 4.59 4.63 3.71 3.42 3.71 4.19
(6) Own due diligence report 4.30 4.10 4.88 4.47 4.61 4.57
(7) Due diligence by accounting/consulting firms 3.30 3.66 3.82 3.75 4.03 4.03
(8) Business plan (overall consistency) 4.63 4.77 4.19 4.06 4.47 4.77
(9) Business plan (P/L) 4.50 4.79 3.81 4.36 4.48 4.38
(10) Business plan (B/S) 4.33 4.42 3.42 4.00 4.26 4.31
(11) Business plan (“latest period” financial 
statements) 
4.65 4.80 3.40 4.03 4.08 4.57
(12) Business plan (more than 1 year ahead) 4.58 4.67 3.27 3.63 4.03 4.36
(13) Business plan (qualified audit report) 3.65 3.78 3.41 3.70 4.21 4.44
Note: VCF: N=41, VCist: N=105, Manigart et al. (2000), p.399 
(N=73 in the U.S., N=66 in the U.K., N=38 in Netherlands and Belgium, N=32 in France). 
 
4.2 Valuation methods 
To determine methods used in valuating potential investments, VCFs and VCists were asked 
to rate the following items on a scale of 1 (never use) to 5 (always use).  These items were 
selected based on the studies by Manigart et al. (2000), and Timmons (1992): (1) Capitalized 
maintainable earning (P/E multiples), (2) Capitalized maintainable earning (EBIT multiples), (3) 
Recent transaction prices for acquisitions in the sector, (4) Discounted value of free cash flows, (5) 
Pay back period, (6) Dividend yield-based, (7) Investor’s special “Rule of thumb” pricing ratios 
and (8) First Chicago method – calculating IRR based on weight averaged earning probabilities of 
three outcome scenarios: success (IPO), sideways survival, and failure (liquidation). 
Among VCFs, (1) Capitalized maintainable earning (P/E multiples) was ranked the highest on 
average, followed by (7) Investor’s special “Rule of thumb” pricing ratios, (4) Discounted value of 
free cash flows, and (5) Pay back period.  On the other hand, VCists ranked (7) Investor’s special 
“Rule of thumb” pricing ratios the highest on average, followed by (1) Capitalized maintainable 




Table 2: Methods used in valuating potential investments 
Manigart et al. (2000) 
 VCF VCist
U.S. U.K. N&B Fran
(1) Capitalized maintainable earning (P/E multiples) 4.05 4.08 3.63 4.31 3.58 3.66
(2) Capitalized maintainable earning (EBIT multiples) 3.34 2.84 3.83 3.90 3.76 3.66
(3) Recent transaction prices for acquisitions in the sector 3.19 3.09 3.78 3.63 3.61 4.22
(4) Discounted value of free cash flows 3.79 3.27 3.62 － 3.89 3.26
(5) Pay back period 3.73 3.90 3.47 － 2.92 4.20
(6) Dividend yield basis 2.12 1.62 2.14 2.22 3.03 2.29
(7) Investor’s special “Rule of thumb” pricing ratios 4.00 4.10 － － － － 
(8) First Chicago method 2．00 1.66 － － － － 
Note: VCF: N=41, VCist: N=105, Note: VCist: N=105, Manigart et al. (2000), p.399  
(N=73 in the U.S., N=66 in the U.K., N=38 in Netherlands and Belgium, N=32 in France). 
 
4.3 Share price, expected duration to exit, and possibility of IPO 
To determine which factors can affect investment decision making, VCFs and VCists were 
asked to rate the following factors on a scale of 1 (not important) to 5 (very important).  We 
selected the following factors based on the study by Hamada (1996): (1) Share price at the time of 
investment, (2) Expected duration to exit, (3) Expected share price at exit, and (4) Possibility of 
IPO. On average, both VCFs and VCists assigned the highest ranking to (1) Share price at the time 
of investment, followed by (3) Expected share price at exit (see Table 3). 
 
Table 3: Important factors for decision making in investment 
VCF VCist  
Mean S D. Mean S D. 
(1) Share price at the time of investment 4.55 0.74 4.66 0.68 
(2) Expected duration to exit 4.20 0.72 4.26 0.90 
(3) Expected share price at exit 4.44 0.81 4.59 0.73 
(4) Possibility of IPO 4.13 0.93 4.28 0.98 
Note: VCF: N=41, VCist: N=105 
 
4.4 Expected internal rate of return. 
VCFs and VCists were asked to indicate the expected internal rate of return at each stage of 
development of investee companies.  For this purpose, we adopted the four stages of 
development advocated by Maison and Harrison (1999), namely, (1) Start-up stage (from 
foundation to achievement of sales), (2) Early stage (from achievement of sales to achievement of 
single-year profit), (3) Growth stage (from achievement of single-year profit to elimination of 
cumulative loss), and (4) Later stage (from elimination of cumulative loss to IPO).  The ranges of 
expected internal rate of return given as answer choices on the questionnaire form were (1) 0-10%, 
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(2) 10-20%, (3) 20-30%, (4) 30-40%, (5) 40-50%, (6) 50-60%, (7) 60-70%, (8) 70-80%, and (9) 
80-100%.  The class value of each of these figures were set at (1) 5%, (2) 15%, (3) 25%, (4) 35%, 
(5) 45%, (6) 55%, (7) 65%, (8) 75%, and (9) 90%. 
Among VCFs, the average expected internal rate of return at each stage of development for 
investee companies is as follows: Start-up stage, 62.5% (standard deviation: 23.00); Early stage 
54.1% (standard deviation: 19.82); Growth stage, 40.8% (standard deviation: 16.81); Later stage, 
30.1% (standard deviation: 17.29). 
Among VCists, on the other hand, the following results were obtained.  Start-up stage, 
70.3% (standard deviation: 21.55); Early stage, 58.7% (standard deviation: 19.79); Growth stage, 
43.6% (standard deviation: 17.33); Later stage, 30.2% (standard deviation: 17.07). At each of 
these stages of development, figures of VCists are somewhat higher than those of VCFs. 
 
 
5. Post investment activities 
5.1 Frequency of financial statements, management reports, and business plans submission 
VCists were asked to indicate, on average, how often they request investee companies to 
submit financial statements, management reports and business plans.  The respondents were to 
choose among answer choices of (1) Monthly, (2) Quarterly, (3) Biannually, (4) Annually, or (5) 
Never.  The results show that respondents requested investee companies they are presently in 
charge of to submit financial statements, management reports, and business plans more often than 
investee companies they had been in charge of since April 1996 (excluding the ones in their 
current charge).  On average, this former group of investee companies is required to submit 
financial statements and management reports (1) Monthly, or (2) Quarterly, and business plans (3) 
Biannually or (4) Annually (see Table 4).  Comparing this with the survey conducted by 
Higashide and Birley (1999) for VCists in the U.K. in 1997, it is evident that Japanese VCists 
require submission of financial statements, management reports and future business plans less 
frequently than their counterparts in the U.K. 
 
5.2 Communication methods and frequency 
VCists were asked to indicate how often and by what means they communicate with investee 
companies.  The respondents were to choose between (1) Daily, (2) Twice a week, (3) Weekly, 
(4), Biweekly, (5) Monthly, (6) Quarterly, or (7) Less than quarterly, for frequency of 
communication, and “Face-to-face”, “Telephone and e-mail”, and “Letter”, for modes of 
communication.  The results show that respondents communicate slightly more frequently, in all 
means of communication (“Face-to-face”, “Telephone and e-mail”, and “Letter”), with investee 
companies they are presently in charge of than with those they had been in charge of since April 
1996 (excluding the ones in their current charge).  On average, they communicate with investee 
companies by “Face to face” meeting (5) Monthly or (6) Quarterly, by “Telephone and e-mail” (4) 
Biweekly or (5) Monthly, and by “Letter” (6) Quarterly or (7) Less than quarterly.  Comparing 
this with the survey conducted by Higashide and Birley (1999), it is evident that Japanese VCists 
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communicate with investee companies less frequently than their counterparts in the U.K., for all 
methods of communication.  It should be noted that e-mail was not included in the answer choice 
offered by Higashide and Birly (1999) (see Table 5). 
 
Table 4: Frequency of submitting: FS, management reports, business plans 
 (1)Monthly (2)Quarterly (3)Biannually (4)Annually (5)Never N / A Mean S D. 
1996- 35.2% 21.0% 25.7% 9.5% 0.0% 8.6% 2.10 1.04 
Present 47.6% 28.6% 15.2% 3.8% 0.0% 4.8% 1.74 0.87 
Financial 
Statements 
Higashide&Birley 96.7% 1.3% 0% 2.5% 0% ‐ 1.1 0.5 
1996- 36.2% 26.7% 22.9% 3.8% 0.0% 10.5% 1.94 0.91 
Present 49.5% 36.2% 9.5% 1.0% 0.0% 3.8% 1.60 0.70 
Management 
Reports 
Higashide&Birley 83.5% 8.9% 0% 2.5% 5.1% ‐ 1.4 1.0 
1996- 5.7% 11.4% 26.7% 41.0% 4.8% 10.5% 3.31 0.98 
Present 7.6% 15.2% 33.3% 37.1% 1.9% 4.8% 3.11 0.97 Business Plans 
Higashide&Birley 36.7% 24.1% 17.7% 16.5% 5.1% ‐ 2.3 1.3 
Note: VCist: N=105, Higashide and Birley (1999), p.88. 
 
Table 5: Communication methods and frequency 
 (1)Daily (2)Twice/week (3)Weekly (4)Biweekly (5)Monthly (6)Quarterly (7)Lesser  Mean S D.
1996- 0.0% 2.9% 3.8% 17.1% 32.4% 26.7% 8.6% 5.11 1.14
Present 0.0% 1.9% 1.9% 21.9% 49.5% 18.1% 2.9% 4.92 0.89Face to 
Face Higashide& 
Birley 
0.0% 2.5% 7.5% 23.8% 37.8% 25.0% 
3.8% 4.9 1.1 
1996- 1.9% 7.6% 15.2% 17.1% 31.4% 14.3% 3.8% 4.39 1.37




13.8% 26.3% 31.3% 15.0% 6.3% 
1.3% 3.6 1.3 
1996- 0.0% 1.0% 1.0% 0.0% 15.2% 21.0% 49.5% 6.32 0.96




0.0% 3.8% 15.0% 13.8% 31.3% 25.0% 
11.3% 4.9 1.3 
 Note: VCist: N=105, Higashide and Birley (1999), p.89. 
 
5.3 Initiation of the replacement of investee companies’ management 
VCists were asked whether they had ever initiated a replacement of management (president 
and board members) of investee companies they had been in charge of since April 1996 (excluding 
the ones in their current charge). 50.5% of them replied they had.  The average number of 
investee companies they had interfered in such manner is 3.04 (standard deviation: 2.62). 
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5.4 Experience in supporting management 
VCists were asked to indicate how they had supported the management of investee companies 
by choosing appropriate items listed below.  The following items were selected based on studies 
by Harrison and Mason (1992), Higashide and Birley (1999), and Kirihata (2006): (1) Debt/equity 
arrangements, (2) Financial Advice, (3) Advice as mentor/coach, (4) Recruitment assistance, (5) 
Internal control/regulations, (6) Business strategies adjustment, (7) Professional contacts 
(accountant, etc.), (8) Industry competition advice, (9) Marketing plan, (10) Advice on short-term 
crisis, and (11) Advice on private matters.   
Most VCists ranked (2) Financial Advice the first, followed by (1) Debt/equity arrangements, 
and (7) Professional contacts.  Taking in account of the studies by Harrison and Mason (1992), 
Higashide and Birley (1999), and Kirihata (2006), we further calculated average values of the 7 
comparable items from the list above. The results are as follows: this study, 72.6%; Kirihata 
(2006), 66.5%; Higashide and Birley (1999), 68.8%; and Harrison and Mason (1992), 51.1%.  
The average number in our study is the highest among all. 
 
Table 6: Experience in supporting venture management 








(1) Debt/equity arrangements 87.6 75.0 72.5 49.4 
(2) Financial Advice 91.4 84.4 82.5 N/A 
(3) Advice as mentor/coach 72.4 62.5 92.5 41.3 
(4) Recruitment assistance 79.0 62.5 53.8 39.7 
(5) Internal control/regulations 40.0 ‐ ‐ ‐ 
(6) Business strategies adjustment 75.2 71.9 71.3 61.5 
(7) Professional contacts (accountant, etc.) 87.6 84.4 72.5 N/A 
(8) Industry competition advice 71.4 75.0 41.3 44.2 
(9) Marketing plan 57.1 62.5 80.0 51.3 
(10) Advice on short-term crisis 65.7 56.3 70.0 70.5 
(11) Advice on private matters 63.8 62.5 60.0 N/A 
Note: VCist: N=105, Ratio of VCists involved in venture management (%). 
This table is based on selected parts of data shown in Harrison and Mason (1992), Higashide and Birley 
(1999), Kirihata (2006) and the results of our questionnaire survey. 
 
5.5 The main causes of failure of investee companies 
We asked VCists to select their three most recent cases of investee companies ended in 
“bankruptcy, dissolution or liquidation”, or “sale to other shareholders or their original owners” 
and indicate the causes of these failures.  Multiple answers were allowed and we received 201 
valid responses for this section.  The figures shown in Table 7 indicate the percentage share of 
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each answer among these valid responses.  The causes of failure offered as answer choices in this 
questionnaire were selected based on the study by Gorman and Sahlman (1989).  The choices 
were (1) Ineffective senior management, (2) Ineffective functional management, (3) Failure in 
developing expected end user market, (4) Poor channel selection/channel resistance, (5) 
Competition, (6) Poor products/market fit, (7) Development delayed or unsuccessful, (8) 
Manufacturing Failure, (9) Poor product/service performance, (10) Inadequate quality control, and 
(11) Failure in recruitment and human resource development.  Among them, (1) Ineffective 
senior management was ranked the first, followed by (3) Failure in developing expected end user 
market, (2) Ineffective functional management, and (7) Development delayed or unsuccessful.  In 
a similar survey conducted with VCists in the U.S. (Gorman and Sahlman, 1989), (1) Ineffective 
senior management also was ranked the first, followed by (7) Development delayed or 
unsuccessful, (2) Ineffective functional management, and (3) Failure in developing expected end 
user market.  These results indicate that there is only little difference between U.S. and Japanese 
VCists in recognizing the causes of failure of investee companies (see Table 7). 
 




(1) Ineffective senior management 72.6% 95% Management 
problems (2) Ineffective functional management 46.3% 50% 
(3) Failure in developing expected end user market 51.7% 43% 
(4) Poor channel selection/channel resistance 22.9% 35% 




(6) Poor products/market fit 18.4% 28% 
(7) Development delayed or unsuccessful 38.3% 51% 
(8) Manufacturing Failure 10.9% 11% 




(10) Inadequate quality control 10.4% 13% 
HR 
problems 
(11) Failure in recruitment and human resource 
development 
30.8% - 
Other 9.0% ‐ 
Note: VCist: N=105, multiple answers allowed,  
% figures represent ratio of each item among all 201 valid responses in our survey,  
and 96 valid responses in the study by Gorman and Sahlman (1989). 
 
 
6. The gap between public offering and opening price 
6.1 Timing of sale of shares and assessment of capital gain realized 
VCFs were asked to locate timings after IPO for the sales of shares of investee companies they 
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had been in charge of since April 1996.  They were also asked to assess the capital gains realized 
from these sales of shares at each timing period.  For the timing of sales, they were allowed to 
choose an answer among (1) Less than 1 month immediately following IPO, (2) More than 1 
month and less than 1 year following IPO, and (3) More than 1 year following IPO.  The capital 
gains realized were to be assessed on a scale of 1 (large) to 5 (small). 
For average timing of sales, (1) Less than 1 month immediately following IPO was ranked the 
first (41.8%), while (2) More than 1 month and less than 1 year following IPO, and (3) More than 
1 year following IPO, respectively took 27.3% and 30.8% of the pie.  Regarding capital gains 
realized from these sales, the average scores for (1) Less than 1 month immediately following IPO, 
(2) More than 1 month and less than 1 year following IPO, and (3) More than 1 year following 
IPO, were 1.84 (standard deviation: 1.11), 2.42 (standard deviation: 0.83), and 3.18 (standard 
deviation: 1.23), respectively.  This illustrates that respondents recognized that sales of shares of 
(1) Less than 1 month immediately following IPO can realize the greatest capital gain.  
 
6.2 Concern and seriousness in price difference 
VCFs and VCists were asked whether they were concerned of the gap between public offering 
price and opening price. Among VCFs, results were as follows: (1) Highly concerned, 22.0%; (2) 
Concerned, 51.2%; (3) Not very concerned, 19.5%; (4) Not concerned at all, 0%; and no response 
or other, 7.3%.  Among VCists, results were as follows: (1) Highly concerned, 20.0%; (2) 
Concerned, 50.5%; (3) Not very concerned, 21.9%; (4) Not concerned at all, 3.8%; and no 
response or other, 3.8%.  As the results reveal, there seems to be little difference between the 
perceptions of VCFs and VCists in this regard. 
However, regarding the gap between public offering price and opening price, the answers 
reflect some differences.  VCFs responded that they found this gap to be: (1) Very problematic, 
12.2%; (2) Problematic, 61.0%; (3) Not very problematic, 14.6%; (4) Not at all problematic, 4.9%; 
and no response or other, 7.3%.  At the same time, VCists considered it to be: (1) Very 
problematic, 22.9%; (2) Problematic, 49.5%; (3) Not very problematic, 18.1%; (4) Not at all 
problematic, 1.9%; and no response or other, 7.6%.  While only 12.2% of VCFs responded that 
they considered this issue to be very problematic, the number of VCists who perceived similarly 
nearly doubled at 22.9%.   
 
6.3 Public offering price 
VCFs and VCists were asked for their opinions regarding public offering price.  The 
responses of VCFs were as follows: (1) Public offering price is set below the actual value of the 
company, 29.3%; (2) Public offering price reflects the fair value of the company, 43.9%; (3) 
Public offering price is set above the actual value of the company, 9.8%; (4) Other, 12.2%; and no 
response, 4.9%.  Among VCists, the responses were: (1) Public offering price is set below the 
actual value of the company, 35.2%; (2) Public offering price reflects the fair value of the 
company, 33.3%; (3) Public offering price is set above the actual value of the company, 17.1%; (4) 
Other, 12.4%; and no response, 1.9%. 
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The VCFs and VCists who selected (1) Public offering price is set below the actual value of 
the company and (3) Public offering price is set above the actual value of the company as their 
answers were further asked to indicate who/what they thought was responsible for such 
under/overpricing. Possible answers provided in this questionnaire were (1) Managing underwriter, 
(2) Investors involved in the IPO, (3) The process of determining public offering price, and (4) 
Other.  Among VCFs, (1) Managing underwriter was ranked first (87.5%), followed by (2) 
Investors involved in the IPO (18.8%), (3) The process of determining public offering price 
(12.5%), and (4) Other (12.5%).  Among VCists, (1) Managing underwriter was also ranked first 
(78.2%), followed by (3) The process of determining public offering price (27.3%), (2) Investors 
involved in the IPO (23.6%),  and (4) Other (14.5%).  Notably, the percentage of VCists who 
selected (3) The process of determining public offering price (27.3%) is more than double that of 
VCFs’ (12.5%). 
 
6.4 Opening price 
VCFs and VCists were asked for their opinions regarding opening price.  The responses of 
VCFs were as follows: (1) Opening price is set below the actual value of the company, 0.0%; (2) 
Opening price reflects the fair value of the company, 9.8%; (3) Opening price is set above the 
actual value of the company, 68.3%; (4) Other, 12.2%, and no response, 9.8%.  Among VCists, 
answers were (1) Opening price is set below the actual value of the company, 1.9%; (2) Opening 
price reflects the fair value of the company, 5.7%; (3) Opening price is set above the actual value 
of the company, 64.8%; (4) Other, 14.3%, and no response, 13.3%.   
The VCFs and VCists who selected (1) Opening price is set below the actual value of the 
company, and (3) Opening price is set above the actual value of the company as their answers 
where further asked to indicate who/what they thought was responsible for such under/overpricing.  
Among VCFs, (2) Investors involved in the IPO was ranked first (71.4%), followed by (1) 
Managing underwriter (17.9%), (3) The process of determining public offering price (7.1%), and 
(4) Other (10.7%).  The results were similar for VCists, who also ranked (2) Investors involved 
in the IPO first (65.7%), followed by (1) Managing underwriter (20.0%), (3) The process of 
determining public offering price (5.7%), and (4) Other (21.4%), accordingly.  
 
6.5 Interest in academic research and application of research results 
VCFs were asked to specify to which extent they were interested in academic research 
concerning the gap between public offering price and opening price. The replies were as follows: 
(1) Very interested, 9.8%; (2) Interested, 51.2%; (3) Not very interested, 29.3%; (4) Not at all 
interested, 4.9%; and no response, 4.9%.  VCFs were also asked to which extent they had applied 
results of such research to their investment activities and the replies were: (1) Fully, 2.4%; (2) 





7. Closing remarks 
In concluding this study, we would like to make some remarks on the differences found in 
VEC’s and our studies. 
First of all, in the study by VEC, the number of cases choosing IPO as their exit gate was 265 
out of 537 cases, or approximately 50%, which was extremely high. In comparison to that, the 
numbers in our study were lower at only 29% for VCFs and 25% for VCists.  The two studies 
were carried out roughly one and a half year difference in time span.  However, IPO atmosphere 
was fairly similar during these periods of time (between 2004 and the middle of 2006). The 
numbers of IPO were 175 cases in 2004, 158 cases in 2005, and 200 cases in 2006, showing no 
significant difference as well.  It is, therefore, difficult to mark time as a crucial cause of this 
discrepancy. 
As a consequent, it can possibly be assumed that this large gap of IPO rates was caused by the 
difference in variety of samples used in the two studies.  The companies we conducted this 
research with were relatively younger than those in VEC’s report.  They seemed to still be in the 
stage of holding their shares, waiting and preparing for IPO.  There were also some differences in 
the ratio of industry breakdown.  Although IT field captured the largest share of samples in both 
reports, it was 28% in VEC’s but 38% in our study.  In contrary, the ratio of bio-technology was 
22% in VEC’s and 17% in ours.  The reason is similar to the one above.  It is because our 
respondents were relatively younger.  VCFs with short career path are likely to select IT over 
bio-technology because of the amount of investment capital required (IT industry requires 
relatively smaller amount of money). Additionally, because bio-technological industry does not 
grow as fast as being expected, the gap is then filled by the traditional sector.  This implies that 
our research reflected a more realistic side of the coin.   
In reality, there are actually not many investment opportunities in the field of bio-technology.  
IT field, on the other hand, is growing and increasing in both Nikkei and VEC.  The total 
investment in IT increased to 77.3 billion yen, equivalent to 2.2 times the number in 2004.  The 
amount of bio-technology, in contrary, declined for the first time in seven years at the rate of 7%, 
to the amount of 19.8 billion yen.  This number could reflect the decline in the growth of 
ventures originated from universities, which is one of the driving forces of bio-technology.   
Even though there has nothing to do with the study by VEC, the problem of moral hazard 
should be touched upon.  As being mentioned by Mr.Tetsuo Kadowaki and some others, this 
problem is known as a problem in the structure of Japanese VCFs5.  In this study, there were only 
2-3 firms that were actually claimed by investors.  Despite that, these companies revealed that it 
was only because of their already established internal standard on how to allocate investments. 
Considering this fact, it can possibly be stated that there is no particular problem in this respect at 
the surface. 
This analysis still yet needs to be revised using data from follow-up surveys.  However, in a 
lot of cases at this point, it seems that the shareholders of VCFs and their main investors of funds 
                                                  
5 See Kadowaki(2003). 
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reside in the same persons.  If this holds true, it implies that VC has not yet been popularized 
among public.  According to a study by VEC, a ratio of individual investors raised from nearly 
none to 77 out of 391 persons during one year before 2005.  This number is equivalent to 14% of 
total investment amount at that time.  This remarkable increase in the number of individual 
investor is sufficient to predict more apparent problems of moral hazard in the near future. 
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